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INTRODUCTION

A majority of jurisdictions in the United States recognize the crime-fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege.' The crime-fraud exception prevents
abuse of the attorney-client privilege. The exception has various formulations, 2 but
it can be stated as follows: No privilege exists where the services of the lawyer are
sought or obtained to enable or aid the client in planning to commit or committing
what the client knew or reasonably should have known is a crime or a fraud.
The basic principles underlying the exception seem simple enough; however,
complex issues arise when an attorney attempts to invoke the crime-fraud exception
against a resisting party. Both the exception and the privilege are based on common
law and the rules of evidence which may vary from state to state Additionally, the
inherent ambiguities that exist within the crime-fraud doctrine have unfortunately,
but not unexpectedly, given rise to differing judicial interpretations. As a result, the
standards and procedures applied to the exception may differ depending on the
jurisdiction. Overthe pasttwo decades, the trend has been toward more uniformity,4
but areas of differing judicial policy still exist. The areas most in need of uniformity
and clarity are: (1) what procedure should courts use to determine whether the
exception applies; (2) what type of communication is susceptible to the exception;
and (3) what elements must be presented to invoke the exception. In the recent
litigation war against tobacco, the true battles have been fought in these three
trenches.5
1.See Christine Hatfield, Comment, The PrivilegeDoctrines-AreThey JustAnother Discovery
Tool Utilized by the TobaccoIndustry to ConcealDamagingnformation?,16 PAcEL. REv., 525, 552
n.180 (1996).
2. Some states have codified the rule in their respective rules of evidence. See KAN. Civ. PROc.
CODEANN. § 60-426 (west 1965) ("[Lawyer-client] privileges shall not extend (I) to a communication
if the judge finds that sufficient evidence, aside from the communication, has been introduced to
warrant a finding that the legal service was sought or obtained in order to enable or aid in the
commission or planning of a crime or atort ....
"); CAL. EVID. CODF,§ 956 (West 1995) ("There is no
privilege under this article if the services ofthe lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone
to commit or plan to commit a crime or a fraud."). Other states, such as South Carolina, have adopted
the exception as part ofthe common law. See State v. Doster, 276 S.C. 647, 651,284 S.E.2d 218, 221
(1981) ("The privilege does not extend to communications in furtherance of criminal tortious or
fraudulent conduct.").
3. See supranote 2.

4. See David J. Fried, Too HighaPriceforTruth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege
for ContemplatedCrimes and Frauds,64 N.C. L. Rev. 443 (1986).
5. Although technically beyond the scope of this article, but because claims of work-product
protection are often broughtin conjunction with claims ofattorney-client privilege, one should note that
the courts have found the crime-fraud exception equally applicable to the work-product doctrine. See
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 102 F.3d 748,751 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he crime-fraud exception applies
in the work-product context.") (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 1994));
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d at 349 ("[W]e have explicitly recognized a crime-fraud
exception to the opinion work product doctrine."); In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig.,
693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1982) ("When the case being prepared involves the client's ongoing
fraud ... we see no reason to afford the client the benefit of [the work product] doctrine. It is only the
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The central issue underlying the application of the crime-fraud exception is the
breadth of its scope. Some commentators assert that the interests to be balanced are
those between the sanctity of the privilege and the administration ofjustice.6 Some
courts fear that applying the exception broadly will allow challenges to more easily
overcome claims of privilege and thus encroach on the time-honored protection for
clients seeking legal counsel.7 The arguments for a narrow application ofthe crimefraud exception, which increases protection for communications between the
attorney and client, are almost always based in policy. The weakness with such
arguments is that the policies which underpin the privilege support a broad scope
and application of the crime-fraud exception.
In recent years, documents revealing the outrageous misconduct of the tobacco
industry have come to light. These documents show the tobacco industry's decadeslong course of misconduct, formulated and carried out with the aid of its lawyers,
to hide from and misrepresent to the public information relating to the health
hazards of cigarettes.' The revelations within the documents indicate what an
unchecked corporation is capable of doing. For more than forty years, the'tobacco
industry avoided the discovery of its nefarious activities by hiding behind discovery
abuse practices 9 and ill-founded claims of privilege.'0 Only by defections within its
own ranks has the tobacco industry's deception been revealed to the public. This

'rightful interests' of the client that the work product doctrine was designed to protect.") (citing In re
Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49, 63 (7th Cir. 1980)).
6. See Fried, supra note 4, at 490-99.
7. See Laser Indus., Ltd. v. Reliant Techs., Inc., 167 F.R.D. 417, 424 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
8. See generally STANTON A. GLANTZ Er AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS (1996).

9. See Thayer v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., No. 5314 (W.D. Mich. 1970) (unpublished
opinion) (providing an in-depth discussion of how the evasive discovery abuse tactics of the tobacco
industry frustrated the plaintiff's ability to obtain a fair trial); Order Imposing Sanctions Upon the
American Tobacco Co. and Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. as Successor by Merger to the
American Tobacco Co., Minnesota v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 30,
1997) (imposing sanctions of $100,000 per day for failure to comply with discovery orders).
10. The lack of foundation to the tobacco industry's claims of privilege is perhaps best evidenced
by the ever-increasing string ofjudicial decisions finding sets of tobacco industry documents simply
not privileged in the first instance. See, e.g., Burton v. R1J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 170 F.R.D. 481 (D.
Kan. 1997) (finding 32 of 33 documents failed to meet the prerequisites for applicability of privilege);
Florida v. American Tobacco Co., No. CL 95-1466 AH (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 28, 1997) (finding 50 Brown
and Williams documents not privileged); August 1, 1997, Report and Recommendation, Florida v.
American Tobacco Co., No. CL 95-1466 AH (finding 281 of 358 tobacco industry "youth programs"
documents not privileged); Order with Respect to Non-Liggett Defendants' Objections to the Special
Master's Report Dated Sept. 10, 1997, Minnesota v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (visited Jan.
28, 1998) <httpll:STIC.neu.edu/MN/l105519disclose.htm> (finding claims of privilege improper for
5 of 14 industry-defined categories of Liggett documents); June 27, 1997 Order, Sackman v. Liggett
Group, Inc., No. CV 93-4166 (N.J.) (finding 305 special project documents not privileged). Indeed,
litigants in tobacco litigation are beginning to view the tobacco industry's exceedingly large number
of claims of privilege to be a fraud. By claiming privilege to such large numbers of documents, the
tobacco industry counts on courts to shy away from privilege challengers' wholesale requests for
review. Privilege challengers face the unfair task of designating small subsets of documents for review
from cryptic and incomplete tobacco industry privilege logs.
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is sad commentary on the tobacco industry, but it also implicates the attomey-client
privilege and the potential for abuse of the legal system. Disclosure of the
industry's and its lawyers' past and ongoing conduct serves as a prime example of
the need for broad application of the crime-fraud exception to protect the public
from misuse of privilege rules.
This article will explore the issues at the heart of the crime-fraud exception as
they have arisen in the context of tobacco litigation. It will define the procedures
for determining whether the exception applies to particular communications, the
elements of the exception, the burden of proof for such a determination, and the
party who bears the ultimate burden. The article will also discuss the apparent
ambiguities within the crime-fraud exception that a party inevitably will face when
challenging an unfounded and illicit claim of the attomey-client privilege.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION INTOBACCO LITIGATION
The legal war against the tobacco industry began more than forty years ago."
During this time, the tobacco industry has used the rules of evidence and procedure
in various ways to frustrate and delay most of the legal claims it faced in furtherance
of an industry-wide plaintiff-strangulation strategy. 2 As a result, the tobacco
industry enjoyed virtual immunity from liability until recently.
At the beginning of this decade, the public gained insight into the tobacco
industry's clandestine operations that the industry had successfully concealed
behind a seemingly infallible curtain of secrecy since the war on tobacco began.' 3
In 1994, Merrell Williams, a whistle-blowing paralegal at one of the tobacco
industry's law firms, provided a glimpse behind that curtain.' The discovery of the
Brown and Williamson Tobacco Company documents revealed the industry's
systematic abuse of the attorney-client and work-product privileges. The most
damaging blow to the tobacco industry occurred when the Liggett Group broke
ranks and settled with the state Attorneys General. The release of the groupings of
the Liggett Settlement Documents has offered further corroborating evidence of this

11. For an in-depth analysis of the history of tobacco litigation, see Robert L. Rabin, Essay, A

SociolegalHistoryoftheTobacco TortLitigation,44 STAN. L. REV. 853 (1992). For a briefdiscussion,
see Tucker S. Player, Note, After the Fall: The Cigarette Papers,the Global Settlement, and the
Futureof Tobacco Litigation, 49 S.C. L. Rev. 311 (1998).

12. See Hatfield, supranote 1, at 558-59, 561-88; Rabin, supranote 11, at 855-76.
13. In 1988, the first documents concerning the special projects division of the Council for
Tobacco Research were discovered in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J.
1988) and Haines v. Liggett Group,Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681 (D.N.J.), vacated, 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir.

1992). The Hainescase contains Judge Sarokin's landmark opinion in which he declared the tobacco
industry the "king of concealment." Haines, 140 F.R.D. at 683.
14. Mr. Williams copied over 10,000 pages of tobacco industry documents and turned them over
to Professor Stanton Glantz, a leader in the anti-smoking movement. GLANTZ ETAL., supra note 8, at
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss2/3
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systematic abuse that was one of the primary reasons for the industry's litigation
success in the past."5
A.

What the Tobacco IndustryDocuments Reveal

During the early 1950s, the tobacco industry faced several scientific studies that
pointed to cigarettes as a cause of disease. 6 In response to these studies and the
surrounding public concern, the tobacco industry issued the "Frank Statement to
Cigarette Smokers."' 7 The Frank Statement marked the genesis of the tobacco

industry's fraudulent and deceitful course of conduct toward the American public,
public health officials, and government regulators. The Frank Statement read, in
part:
We accept an interest in people's health as a basic responsibility,
paramount to every other consideration inour business.... We believe the
products we make are not injurious to health.... We also have and always
will cooperate with those whose tasks it is to safeguard the public
health.... Many people have asked us what we are doing to .meet the
public's concern aroused by the recent reports. Here is the answer:
1. We are pledging aid and assistance to the research effort into all
phases of tobacco use and health. This joint financial aid will of
course be in addition to what is already being contributed by
individual companies. 8
Anyone reading the pledges of the Frank Statement could have reasonably
believed not only that the tobacco industry was not knowingly manufacturing and
marketing a dangerous product, but also that the tobacco industry was committed
to manufacturing a safe product. Moreover, a person could have reasonably
believed that the tobacco industry intended to address the health concerns
surrounding its products in an open and forthright manner. Considering the internal
tobacco documents now at issue, nothing could be further from the truth. In fact,
these documents show that the tobacco industry knew to a reasonable degree of
scientific certainty as early as 1953 that cigarettes cause cancer' 9 and internally
acknowledged as early as 1963 that nicotine is addictive.2' Nonetheless, in the

15. For an excellent, in-depth analysis of this abuse, see Hatfield, supra note 1,at 590-604.
16. See, e.g., Ernest L. Wynder &Evarts A. Graham, Tobacco Smoking as a PossibleEtiologic
Factorin BronchiogenicCarcinoma: A Study ofSix Hundred and Eighty-FourProvedCases, 143

JAMA 329, 329 (1950).
17. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 8, at 139.

18.See id.
19.Id.
20. Id. at 100.
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days, months, and years following the issuance of the Frank Statement, the tobacco
industry renewed and bolstered its pledges of concern for health and safety.
The fraudulent workings of the tobacco industry do not involve simply lying to
the public about the true state of its knowledge concerning the health dangers of
cigarettes, though that would be bad enough.
Rather, the tobacco
industry-together with its "lawyers"--has engaged in decades of fraud and
conspiracy to (1) affirmatively create doubt and controversy in the public's mind
regarding the health dangers of cigarettes, (2) to misuse scientific research for its
own ends rather than the pro bono publico ends solemnly promised in the Frank
Statement, (3) to control the course of science and scientists investigating smoking
and health issues, and (4) to create unfounded bases for claims of privilege and
protection as shields against discovery.
The tobacco industry continues to promote and maintain the appearance of
controversy over the negative health effects caused by cigarette smoke with full
knowledge that such controversy is nonexistent in light of the overwhelming
majority of scientific research.2' The documents reveal that the purpose for the
creation and maintenance of this illusory controversy is to give smokers a
"psychological crutch" to rest upon to justify their decisions to smoke. 22
The primary tool used to bolster the pledges of the Frank Statement has been
the Tobacco Industry Research Center (TIRC), now known as the Council for
Tobacco Research (CTR).' Though the publicly stated purpose of the TIRC/CTR
was to conduct independent research concerning the health effects of cigarettes, the
true purpose has been to create any scintilla of evidence that would facially justify
the industry's position that cigarettes are not a health hazard.24 The TIRC/CTR has
been a public relations ploy controlled entirely by the industry. This ploy allows the
industry to maintain the appearance of a controversy over the health effects of
cigarettes. As a result, the tobacco industry still denies that cigarettes are addictive
or cause disease,' a position in direct conflict with the information contained in the
industry's own documents.
The tobacco industry's most egregious activities concern its alleged targeting
of children and manipulation of nicotine.26 These activities are quasi-criminal at the

21. Id. at 139.
22. Affidavit of Professor John P. Freeman, Florida v. American Tobacco Co., No. CL 95-1466
AH, at 28 n.9 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1997).
23. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 8, at 32. The Special Projects division of the CTR was the
evidentiary focus of Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 688-89 (D.N.J. 1992) and
Cipollone v. Liggett Group,Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1491 (D.N.J. 1988).
24. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 8, at 44-46.
25.id. at 26, 40, 114.
26. See Liggett Documents (visited Jan. 18, 1998) <http://STIC.neu.edu/index2.html>
(Memorandum from K.E. Cohn Development ofCigarettewith IncreasedSmoke PH)(Sept. 7, 1977).
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very least. Increasing evidence is coming to light that shows the tobacco companies
intentionally directed advertising at underage consumers.27
B. The Attorneys' GeneralMost Effective Tool
Demonstrating a strategically orchestrated pattern of fraud and concealment,
the internal documents of the tobacco industry support numerous causes of action
against the tobacco industry nd are the keys to success in the current theater of
tobacco litigation. Given such importance, these documents must be both
discoverable and admissible in trial, and the most intense legal maneuvering
between the tobacco industry and the Attorneys General has concerned these
documents. Within this arena, the crime-fraud exception has become a highly
important and effective weapon in the Attorneys' General arsenal.
In conjunction with the industry's elaborate scheme of fraud and concealment
is the infusion of industry lawyers to control nearly every aspect of the industry's
research and public relations activities concerning the health effects of cigarettes.28
The tobacco industry argues that attorney involvement created a facial claim of both
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection applicable to virtually all of
the contested documents. The industry has relied on these claims of privilege to
contest the production and admissibility of any industry document at trial. However,
Attorneys General have challenged these facial claims of privilege and have argued
that the industry manufactured privilege.29 Regardless of how a court handles the
industry's facial claims of privilege, the insidious nature of the documents often
gives rise to the crime-fraud exception-the trump card to asserted claims of the
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. Even if the industry can
satisfy all of the requirements for a facial claim of privilege, a court will not protect
the communication if the crime-fraud exception applies. Predictably, the crimefraud exception has been a central issue in tobacco litigation.
Through the course of legal wrangling over the exception, the tobacco
industry's misuse of the legal precedents concerning the crime-fraud exception has
exposed perceived grey areas in the crime-fraud doctrine. Yet, the crime-fraud
exception needs a more definitive statement of what it is and how a court should

27. See id.; R.J. Reynolds Called18-Year-Olds 'Critical'to Cigarettes' Success, WALL ST. J.,
July 11, 1996, at B6; John Swartz, Tobacco Firm Found to Have Targeted Young, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 4, 1995, atA8; see also Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318, 1321
(4th Cir. 1995) (discussing Baltimore City Council findings and support for Ordinance 307 that tobacco
industry affirmatively targeted minors with advertising), vacated,Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v.
Schmoke, 116 S. Ct. 2575, judgment reinstated and modified, Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v.
Baltimore, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996), cert.denied,Penn Adver. ofBaltimore, Inc. v. Schmoke, 117
S. Ct. 1569 (1997).
28. See Hatfield, supranote 1,passim.
29. The issues surrounding the tobacco industry's attempts to manufacture privilege by

incorporating lawyers into standard business and public relations activities are thoroughly discussed
in Hatfield, supra note 1, atpassim.
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determine its applicability. By examining the policies behind both the exception and
the respective privileges, as well as some of the more widely accepted judicial
precedents, one can derive a clear understanding of the crime-fraud doctrine.
III. THE POLICY BEHIND THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION
In the annals of jurisprudence, the oldest and most universally established
protection of confidential communication is the attorney-client privilege." This
privilege lies at the very heart of the American legal profession, and its policies
promote public confidence in the profession and the fair administration ofjustice.
However, this privilege is not absolute. Well-established exceptions to the privilege
attempt to mitigate illogical results and to further the policies upon which the
privilege itself rests. The crime-fraud doctrine is such an exception.
The justification for the crime-fraud exception is firmly rooted in social and

judicial policy. The basic theory is that clients should not be able to use legal advice
to perpetrate or plan ongoing or future unlawful activity and then use the privilege
as a shield from disclosure.3 ' Though the exception is simple and straightforward
at its foundation, the exact scope of the crime-fraud exception has been disputed.
An examination ofthe specific policies supporting the crime-fraud exception leads
one to the inescapable conclusion that the exception's scope should be broad and
encompass those activities beyond the technical definition of"crimes" and "frauds."
The first policy purports that any such communication between an attorney and
client does not satisfy the requirements for the privilege to apply. 2 A second policy
is that broad application of the crime-fraud exception protects the privilege from
abuse.33 A third policy recognizes the duty of lawyers as officers of the court and
requires lawyers to operate within the bounds of the law.3" Though one may use any
of these policies to justify the exception, a combination solidifies the appropriate
role of the exception in modem jurisprudence.
A. The Scope of the Privilege
For the attorney-client privilege to provide protection, the communication must
take place in confidence between an attorney and a client for the purposes of
obtaining or of seeking legal assistance. In situations where this communication
deals with unlawful conduct, either in progress or contemplation, the
communication falls outside the realm of the attorney-client privilege. Even if the
attorney is "innocent," when a client intends to use a communication with the

30. EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 2 (3d ed. 1997).

31. Id. at 1-3.
32. See infra Part III.A.
33. See infra Part III.B.
34. See infra Part III.C.
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attorney to aid unlawful conduct, the client has stepped beyond the bounds of the
definition of "client" for purposes of the attorney-client privilege.35 This rationale
is based somewhat on deterrence. Once the client has overstepped the bounds of
seeking legitimate legal services, the privilege rules should deter the client from
attempting to obtain illegitimate legal services by stripping away the protection of
the privilege. 6
The proper attorney-client relationship cannot exist when communications are
intended to aid unlawful activity.37 In a similar context, a privilege against
disclosure of juror deliberations is not absolute where the juror relationship is
tainted by dishonesty in voir dire that surely would have disqualified the juror. In
the seminal case of Clark v. United States38 involving the privilege of juror
communication, Justice Cardozo explained:
The privilege takes as its postulate a genuine relation, honestly created and
honestly maintained. If that condition is not satisfied, if the relation is
merely a sham and a pretense, the juror may not invoke a relation
dishonestly
assumed as a cover and cloak for the concealment of the
39
truth.
Cardozo later analogized this policy to the attorney-client privilege, stating that
"[t]he [attorney-client] privilege takes flight if the relation is abused." 0 Thus no
legitimate attorney-client relationship can exist once the focus or intent of the
communication turns to unlawful activity.
Justice Cardozo is not alone in his recognition that privilege cannot apply to an
illegitimate relationship between attorney and client. Wigmore on Evidence begins
its discussion of the crime-fraud exception with the following passage:
It has been agreed from the beginning that the privilege cannot avail to
protect the client in concerting with the attorney a crime or other evil
enterprise. This is for the logically sufficient reason that no such enterprise
falls within the just scope of the relation between legal adviser and client."
Additionally, the English courts used this same rationale in the 1884 decision of
Queen v. Cox.42 An even earlier case in the United States stated: "The privileged

35. JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENTPRIVILEGE

4.01[3][b] (1987).

36. Id.
37. See id., 4.01[3][a].
38. 289 U.S. 1 (1933).

39. Id. at 14.
40. Id. at 15.
41.8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2298 (John T. McNaughton rev. 1961).
42. 14 L.R. 153 (Q.B. 1884).
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relation of attorney and client can only exist for lawful and honest purposes.,
Clearly this policy is firmly embedded in American jurisprudence.

43

B. The Policiesof the Privilege
Numerous policies support the attorney-client privilege." One frequently cited
policy is that the privilege is a "necessity, in the interest and administration of
justice."45 For our justice system to function properly, a client must be able to
confide in a legal advisor all of the words and actions without fearing repercussions
from such disclosure. Yet when justice is thwarted by this protection, the policy no
longer justifies secrecy. Thus any conduct which is intended to hinder the proper
administration ofjustice will destroy the privilege.46 Because we are concemed with
the proper administration of justice, "it would be a perversion of the privilege to
extend it to the client who seeks advice to aid him in carrying out an illegal or
fraudulent scheme. 47
At the core of the policies supporting the attorney-client privilege and the
crime-fraud exception is the delicate balance between the society's interests in full
disclosure of evidence and the client's private interests in protecting confidential
communications with the attorney. 48 This balance is commonly characterized as a
Utilitarian philosophy, in which the social advantage of the policy is determined.49
For a privilege to be recognized, the injury to the individual client must outweigh
the benefits of a proper disposition of the controversy through disclosure of all
relevant evidence." Ifthe communication is intended for illegitimate purposes, then
the client's interests should not be protected by privilege.
Numerous courts have expounded on this balancing process. For instance, in
Clarkv. UnitedStates, Justice Cardozo reasoned that once the interests of the client
turn illegitimate, "[it must yield to the overmastering need, so vital in our polity,
of preserving trial by jury in its purity against the inroads of corruption."'" Other
courts have discussed how the balance between the privacy and public policy
interests shifts once the intentions turn illegitimate. 2 At this point, the client's

43. Coveney v.. Tannahill, 1 Hill 33, 35, 41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841), quoted in WIGMORE ON
supranote 41, § 2298, at 577.
44. For an in-depth analysis of the attorney-client privilege, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An
HistoricalPerspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REv. 1061 (1978).
45. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
46. 81 AM. JUR.2D Witnesses § 394 (1992).
47. McCoPiuICK ON EVIDENCE § 95 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
48. GERGACZ, supranote 35, 4.01[3][d].
49. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 41, § 2285.
50.Id.
51. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 16 (1933).
52. See, e.g., Law Offices ofBernard D. Morley, P.C. v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Colo.
1982) (en banc) (explaining that the privacy policies underlying the privilege must subside when
communication between an attorney and a client involves the commission of criminal acts).
EVIDENCE,
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interest, and thus the privilege, must give way to public policy and the proper
administration of justice. 3
C. ProfessionalConcerns

Wigmore on Evidence notes that supporting and utilizing the exception has
significant implications for the legal profession. By allowing the privilege to stand
in the way of disclosure of illegitimate communications, the attorney "bring[s]
discredit upon the legal profession" and betrays the "public confidence which alone
justifies the privilege."54 This policy may seem at odds with the privilege, as it is a
privilege for the client. Yet, the implications for the profession are obvious.
An attorney has a duty to the client to provide the best legal representation
possible within the boundaries of the law. An attorney also has a duty of honesty
and candor as an officer of the court. Giving advice or assistance that would aid or
enable the planning of unlawful conduct is beyond the scope of the attorney's job
and professional duty. Thus when a communication is intended to aid any
unlawful conduct, the attorney cannot be acting in a professional capacity, and the
communication does not meet the requirements for application of the privilege. 6 In
this type of situation, the "[a]dvice given for those purposes would not be a
professional service but participation in a conspiracy.""
Considering the goal of maintaining the integrity of the legal profession, the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct governs an attorney's proper
representation of a client.5 Though Rule 1.6 provides stringent requirements on
disclosure of client communications, the Model Rules as a whole concern the
broader perspective of the attorney's role in the justice system and in society. The
preamble to the Model Rules describes an attorney as "an officer of the legal system
and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice."59
Specifying that the Model Rules requires a "lawyer's conduct [to] conform to the
requirements of the law," the preamble dictates that "[a] lawyer should use the law's
procedures only for legitimate purposes., 6 ' As a citizen, a "lawyer should seek
improvement of the law, the administration of justice and the quality of service

53. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 641 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) ("If
there is a prima facie showing that the professional relationship was intended to further a criminal
enterprise, the privilege does not exist.") (citing United States v. Hodge& Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347,1354
(9th Cir. 1977)); Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26, 31 (Colo. 1982) (noting that the scope of the
privilege is not absolute and must be limited where "communications between a client and his attorney
are made for the purpose of aiding the commission of a future crime or a present continuing crime").
54. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 41, § 2299.
55. GERGACZ, supra note 35, 4.01[l], [3][a].
56. Id. 4.01[3][a].
57. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 47, § 95.
58. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1997).

59. Id. pmbl. at 5.
60.Id.
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rendered by the legal profession."'" One may have difficulty contemplating how a
lawyer can allow the legal advice given to thwart the proper administration of
justice, but it is the client who destroys the privilege through criminal or fraudulent
action.
D. The Scope of the Exception
A point of contention among courts is the exact scope of the crime-fraud
exception. The controversy lies in the type of conduct which will invoke the
exception and whether it must satisfy the technical requirements of a "crime" or a
"fraud." Some courts have held that in order to apply the exception, the conduct
must satisfy statutorily or judicially recognized elements of a particular crime or
fraud.62 The tobacco industry has argued that this narrow view should confine the
use of the crime-fraud exception in tobacco litigation.63 The policy behind this
narrow construction seems to be afear of creating a chilling effect on attorney-client
communications.' Yet, other courts have rejected this possibility." In Clark v.
UnitedStates,Justice Cardozo dismissed this fear by stating: "The chance that now
and then there may be found some timid soul who will take counsel of his fears and
give way to their repressive power is too remote and shadowy to shape the course
ofjustice."'
More significantly, some scholars argue thatthe narrow view of the exception's
scope directly conflicts with the exception's underlying policies because it ignores
the purpose of the exception.67 Wigmore on Evidence states: "Yet it is difficult to
see how any moral line can properly be drawn at that crude boundary [of technical
definitions of crime and fraud], or how the law can protect a deliberate plan to defy
the law and oust another person of his rights, whatever the precise nature of those
rights may be."68
Most courts use a broad application of the exception.69 The unconscionable
practices of corporate America, which gave rise to mass torts litigation such as
asbestos, Dalkon Shield, and tobacco, seem to serve as a catalyst for the broad
construction. Indeed, the exception is named somewhat inappropriately as courts
throughout the country have found that both law and policy require application of
the exception beyond those circumstances where the technical definition of crime

61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036, 1051 (D. Del. 1985);
Research Corp. v. Gourmet's Delight Mushroom Co., 560 F. Supp. 811, 820 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
63. See GERGACZ, supra note 35, 4.01[4][a].
64. See id.
65. See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 1970).
66. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 16 (1933).
67. GERGACZ, supranote 35, 4.01[4][a].
68. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supranote 41, § 2298, at 577.
69. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
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or fraud is met.7" The policies underlying both the privilege and the exception
demand that deceitful conduct, including activities beyond the scope of criminal or
common law fraud, such as abuse of the attorney-client relationship, not be
protected from disclosure.7' This view of the exception's application is not
expansive; as one court put it: "'Acts constituting fraud are as broad and as varied
as the human mind can invent.' 72
Though defendants may argue that the attorney-client privilege is a sacred
institution that should only be encroached upon in the most egregious of
circumstances, the policies underlying the crime-fraud exception clearly dictate a
broad construction of the exception which should extend to all forms of misconduct.
IV. SORTING OUT THE CRIME-FRAUD PROCEDURE
In the current tobacco litigation, the key issues between the parties are in the
context ofthe crime-fraud exception: what procedure the court should follow, what
the burden of proof is, and who carries this burden. Courts do not universally agree
on a single specific procedure or burden of proof. The Supreme Court recognized
the confusion concerning the specifics of the crime-fraud exception, but declined
an opportunity to resolve that confusion.73 The result appears to be a loosely
connected framework where the details become muddled in seemingly inconsistent
judicial interpretations. Although the crime-fraud exception appears unsettled, the
cases present a clear picture in which both practical and policy considerations are
satisfied.
A. The Zolin Showing
Prior to the 1989 landmark case of United States v. Zolin,74 considerable
controversy existed among the circuits about what evidence courts could consider

70. See, e.g., Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 979 F.2d 332, 353-54 (4th Cir. 1992)
(finding that "improprieties, breaches of fiduciary duties, and violations of securities laws" are

sufficient to deny application of the attorney-client privilege); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (extending the exception to "crime, fraud or other misconduct"); Cooksey v.Hilton
Int'l Co., 863 F. Supp. 150, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying the exception to "intentional torts moored

in frauid"); Central Constr. Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 794 P.2d 595,598 (Alaska 1990) ("Public Policy
demands that the "fraud" exception to the attorney-client privilege ...be given the broadest
interpretation."' (quoting In re Callan, 300 A.2d 868, 877 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1973))); State v.
Doster, 276 S.C. 647, 651, 284 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1981) (noting the "widely recognized rule that the

privilege does not extend to communications in furtherance of criminal, tortious or fraudulent
conduct"); Volcanic Gardens Mgmt. Co. v. Paxson, 847 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993)
(refusing to limit the application of the exception only in cases of common law or criminal fraud).
71. See International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 180 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
72. Central Constr.Co., 794 P.2d at 598 (quoting In re Callan, 300 A.2d 868, 877 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1973)).
73. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 n.7 (1989).
74. 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
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to determine whether the crime-fraud exception applied to allegedly privileged
communications.75 The Zolin rule was rather simple: A court can consider "any
relevant evidence, lawfully obtained, that has not been adjudicated to be
privileged."76 Thus, because the Court recognized that the communication itself is
often the best evidence of its true nature," a claim of privilege regarding the
communication in contention does not immunize it from the court's consideration. 8
From this analytical basis, the Court determined that in camera review of the
communications in contention is an appropriate, and often necessary, tool for
adjudicating the privilege challenge.79 Inspection of the documents at issue may be
made after the privilege challenger makes a threshold showing. The threshold
showing is ".a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable
person' that in camerareview of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the
claim that the crime-fraud exception applies."8 Once the challenger meets this
threshold requirement, the intrusion upon the attorney-client privilege is minimal
and does not destroy the privilege, if it in fact exists.8 ' The trial judge may
implement such inspection. Zolin's threshold requirement is not stringent and
primarily discourages fishing expeditions by opposing parties into confidential
attorney-client communications;82 however, some foundation in fact mustjustify any
intrusion into the privilege. 3
Despite the Zolin Court's specific definition of the threshold standard, the
tobacco industry consistently argues for a higher burden on the privilege challenger.
The tobacco industry ignores that the "'decision to engage in in camera review
implicates a much more lenient standard of proof than the determination to apply
84
the crime/fraud exception."'
In re GrandJury Investigation5 articulates the most probing and thoughtful
analysis of the Zolin standard. In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit noted that in camera
review is appropriate where such review may reveal evidence to establish the

75. See id. at 563 n.7.
76. Id. at 575.
77. Id. at 573.
78. See id. at 574 n.12.
79. Id. at 574.
80. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572 (quoting Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo. 1982))
(citation omitted).
81. See id. After the challenger makes the threshold showing, the trial judge has discretion to
allow in camera inspection. Factors which a court may consider in deciding to proceed with in camera
inspection after the threshold is met include: the amount of material to be reviewed; the relevancy of
the material to the merits of the case at the bar; and the likelihood that in camera review vill
produce
evidence in favor of applying the crime-fraud exception. Id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. Hainesv. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81,96 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Haines v. Liggett Group
Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 690 (D.N.J. 1992)); see Inre Grand Jury Subpoena, 31 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir.

1994); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 1992).
85. 974 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1992).
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applicability of the exception. 6 While confirming that the Zolin threshold analysis
requires some speculation,87 the court properly clarifies the nature of the threshold
factual showing required by Zolin as a reasonable person's good faith belief. The
analysis does not require a showing that the exception actually applies, but merely
that it "'may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the... exception applies."' 88
The difference between these two standards "results in a considerably lower
threshold for conducting in camerareview."89 In short, the Zolin threshold standard
balances the policies and rationales behind both the privilege and the exception to
arrive at a common ground.9"
To establish the threshold requirement, a privilege challenger can use only that
evidence not formally adjudicated to be privileged.9 ' Additionally, only the
challenger may present evidence for establishing the preliminary threshold.92 As a
result, establishing the threshold in subsequent cases concerning the same or similar
communications is easier. The court can consider rulings of other courts concerning
the applicability of the crime-fraud exception to the same documents in question.9'
Obviously, any prior holding of the exception's applicability to a particular group
of communications should satisfy the minimal threshold burden with respect to the
same documents in another case. Otherwise, a court would have to find that the
prior determination was devoid of reason or made in bad faith.94
In addition to its explicit approval of in camera inspection of contested
communications, Zolin offered guidance for the proper procedure courts should
follow in determining whether the exception applies. Though the Court refused to
86. Id. at 1073.
87. Id. ("The Zolin threshold is designed to prevent 'groundless fishing expeditions,' not to
prevent all speculation by the district court." (quoting United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 571
(1989))).
88. Id. (quoting Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572) (emphasis added).

89.Id.
90. Id. at 1072 ("The Zolin threshold is set sufficiently low to discourage abuse of privilege and
to ensure that mere assertions of the attorney-client privilege will not become sacrosanct.").
91. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 574.
92. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 31 F.3d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that the court need
not consider countervailing evidence during the Zolin threshold showing); Haines v. Liggett Group Inc.,
975 F.2d 81, 96 (3d Cir. 1992) ("For in camerainspection, it would be sufficient for the district court,
in its discretion, to consider only the presentation made by the party challenging the privilege.").
93. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 107 F.R.D. 2, 10 (D. Kan. 1985) (taking judicial notice of
the existence, rather than the ontents, of a report procured by another court where the report served
in an "advisory and evidentiary capacity").
94. As the tobacco litigation is proceeding contemporaneously in a number of different courts,
plaintiffattomeys have attempted to use unprivileged documents in otherjurisdictions to meet the Zolin
showing. The tobacco industry has opposed this use, arguing that the presiding court cannot consider
the documents during the Zolin analysis because they are privileged. The industry's argument fails
because it misunderstands and misconstrues Zolin. The Zolin Court specifically found this argument
to be exempt from a Zolin analysis---the materials must be adjudicated to be privileged, not merely
claimed to be privileged. The Court will not presume that the materials are privileged simply because
a party claims privilege. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 566-67. Therefore, documents adjudicated not to be
privileged in other jurisdictions may be examined by the presiding court in its Zolin analysis. Id.at 574.
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resolve all questions concerning the crime-fraud exception, when considered with
other courts' decisions, Zolin provides at least a framework for courts to determine
when the exception applies.
B. In Camera Inspection andthe PrimaFacieStandard
1. The Controversy
If the presiding court decides not to inspect the contested communication in
camera,the inquiry ends, and the communications are adjudicated to be privileged
in that proceeding.95 Ifa court decides to inspect the communications in camera,the
court considers the communications, along with the preliminary threshold evidence,
to determine if the crime-fraud exception applies. This stage of the analysis creates
the most controversy in tobacco litigation. The primary issue becomes the burden
of proof. Courts have consistently held that to invoke the exception, the privilege
challenger must show only prima facie evidence96 or probable cause97 that the
communication is sufficiently related to a crime or fraud. While courts define the
necessary type of evidence in varying language, the substantive definition remains
the same.9" Prima facie evidence is most commonly defined as "evidence which, if
believed by the fact-finder, would be sufficient to support a finding that the
elements of the crime-fraud exception were met."" Significantly, the party
challenging the privilege "does not have to establish probable cause of fraud
through independent evidence; rather, the court may make such determination based
on the in camera review of documents."'"
The central source of confusion is the lack of a definitive codified rule
governing procedure. The tobacco industry argues that Federal Rule of Evidence

95. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572.
96. Haines, 975 F.2d at 95.
97. See In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 491 n.7 (2d Cir. 1982).
98. CompareIn re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir.
1982) (defining "prima facie case" as "[evidence s]uch as will suffice until contradicted and overcome
by other evidence" (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1353 (rev. 4th ed. 1968))) with In re Antitrust
Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 166 (6th Cir. 1986) (requiring a privilege challenger to establish a prima
facie case by showing that a 'prudent person ha[s] a reasonable basis to suspect the perpetration of
a crime or fraud' (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d
1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1984))). Though both standards are different to some degree, the difference is
irrelevant with respect to the burden on the privilege challenger. If the evidence is sufficient to apply
the crime-fraud exception, regardless ofany contradictory evidencepresented by the privilege claimant,
then the opposing party has satisfied its burden of proof.
99. Haines, 975 F.2d at 95-96.
100. Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
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104(a)" °' governs the procedure.' 2 Yet with one exception,0 3 courts have
not
4
addressed Rule 104(a) in their discussions of the crime-fraud procedure.'
Subsections (a) and (b) of Rule 104 require the presiding judge to decide
preliminary issues of fact to determine if privilege exists. 5 The language of Rule
104(a) suggests that the rule should govern some aspect of the crime-fraud
procedure because the rule relates to a court's determination of privilege. The
Supreme Court's decision in Zolin implies, if not directly recognizes, that Rule
104(a) applies to this determination. 0 5 Yet, courts have been reluctant to qualify the
crime-fraud procedure under Rule 104(a) regardless ofthis apparent logical relation.
Two possible reasons may explain this nearly uniform lack of reliance on Rule
104(a). First, Rule 104(a) states that in making a preliminary determination of fact,
the court "is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges."'0 7 The rule of evidence concerning privileges requires that the
determination of privilege be "governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience."'0 8 Construing these rules together, courts may understand that they
exempt determinations of privilege from the normal practice in determining
preliminary issues of fact. Thus, common law developments on issues of privilege,
rather than procedures established under Rule 104(a), would bind a court. This is
important considering the tobacco industry's primary purpose in attempting to
establish the applicability of Rule 104(a).
The Bour/ailyopinion and the tobacco industry's interpretation of that decision
provides the second explanation for courts' refusal to discuss Rule 104(a) in the
crime-fraud context. The tobacco industry relies on Bourailyv. UnitedStates0 9 to
argue that Rule 104(a) requires the privilege challenger to show by apreponderance
of the evidence that the crime-fraud exception applies to a contested
communication."
This allocation of the burden directly conflicts with the
established common law procedure which requires only a prima facie showing to
justify application of the crime-fraud exception.
The BourailyCourt discussed Rule 104(a) in terms of admissibility of evidence
at trial. In contrast, the procedure for determining the existence of privilege and the
related applicability of the crime-fraud exception concerns only the discovery of the

101. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).

102. See American Tobacco Co. v. Florida, 697 So. 2d 1249, 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
103. See Laser Indus., Ltd. v. Reliant Techs., Inc., 167 F.R.D. 417, 438 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
104. See, eg., American Tobacco, 697 So. 2d at 1249.
105. FED. R. EVID. 104(a), (b).
106. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 565-68 (1989) (discussing whether Rule 104(a)
prevents in camera review of a contested communication in a crime-fraud determination).
107. FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
108. FED. R. EVID.501.

109.483 U.S. 171 (1987).
110. Id. at 175-76; see American Tobacco Co. v. Florida, 697 So. 2d 1249, 1253-54 (Fla. Dist.

Ct. App. 1997).
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communication and not its admissibility at trial."' Although the determination of
privilege and the admissibility of evidence at trial are separate issues addressed
under Rule 104(a)," 2 a court will not necessarily conduct two separate
determinations of privilege, one for discovery and another for admission of the
documents at trial. Rather, the privilege determination made for discovery purposes
is a final decision with respect to the privileged status of the documents. The
determination of admissibility at trial concerns only traditional evidentiary issues
such as relevancy, hearsay, and the like. Therefore, Bourjaily does not explicitly
govern the crime-fraud procedure; it governs only whether documents deemed not
privileged are admissible at trial. Because Bourjailyhas no direct application to the
privilege determination, and because a distinguished body of law concerning the
crime-fraud procedure exists, a court has little reason to address Rule 104(a) in a
crime-fraud procedural decision. Clearly, courts rely on Rule 501's common law
route rather than Rule 104(a) for the specifics of the crime-fraud procedure.
Two courts have addressed Rule 104(a)'s applicability to the crime-fraud
procedure." 3 In LaserIndustries,Ltd. v. Reliant Technologies, Inc. the courts held
that Rule 104(a) governed the crime-fraud procedure and required the party
opposing the privilege to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
exception applied to a particular communication." 4 Yet, the LaserIndustries court
blatantly ignored both the policies underlying the exception and the inherent
disadvantages that a privilege challenger faces." 5 In fact, no other court has cited
Laser Industries with approval or applied a similar requirement in deciding the
exception's applicability.
In contrast, the American Tobacco court held that Bourjaily's requirement of
a preponderance standard does not apply to the crime-fraud exception." 6 The
tobacco industry argued that Florida law, which is almost identical to Rule 104(a),
requires a privilege challenger to prove the exception's existence by a
preponderance of the evidence."' While finding that the preponderance standard
conflicted with the bulk of judicial precedent that required only a prima facie
showing, the court admitted that evidence is usually weighed under a less than the
preponderance standard."' At first glance, this admission may seemingly create a

111. See Bourjaily,483 U.S. at 175-76.
112. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
113. See Laser Indus., Ltd. v. Reliant Techs., Inc., 167 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1996); American
Tobacco Co., 697 So. 2d 1249.
114. See Laser Indus., 167 F.R.D. at 437-38.
115. Id. at 423-25 (citing the importance of the attorney-client privilege but not addressing the
policy considerations discussed supra in Part III); see also In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, (7th Cir.
1988) (recognizing the fundamental disadvantage the privilege challenger faces due to its unfamiliarity
with the disputed communication).
116. See American Tobacco, 697 So. 2d at 1254-56.
117. Id at 1253.

118. Id. at 1256.
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dichotomy; however, a closer look at the crime-fraud procedure shows that the
American Tobacco court used the correct analysis, requiring only prima facie proof.
Importantly, both the LaserIndustries andAmerican Tobacco courts followed
the rule established in Hainesv. Liggett GroupInc."9 and In re Feldberg20 that the
claiming party is allowed to present rebuttal evidence upon a prima facie showing
that the crime-fraud exception applied. The Haines-Feldbergline of decisions hold
that, in the interest of fairness, a court should not deny the recognition of privilege
without allowing the privilege claimant to explain or rebut the evidence of the
crime-fraud exception."2 ' Allowing rebuttal evidence would seem to alleviate the
implication of unfairness hinted at in Zolin."' As the American Tobacco court
correctly recognized, allowing rebuttal evidence implicates use of a weighing
process to determine whether the crime-fraud exception applies. If the parties
present a court with prima facie evidence for exception and rebuttal evidence for
recognition of the privilege, then the court must weigh the evidence to make a
ruling. Responding to the need for a weighing test, the Laser Industries court
interpreted Bour/aily and Rule 104(a) to require a privilege challenger to meet the
preponderance standard.'" However, the conflict between Bouraily and the
established common law crime-fraud procedure requiring only a prima facie
showing caused the American Tobacco court to reject Rule 104(a). 24 These
inconsistencies give rise to much confusion among courts attempting to make a
crime-fraud determination.
2. An Explanation
One explanation of the crime-fraud procedure reconciles American Tobacco
and Bourfaily and accounts for the uniform lack of recognition of LaserIndustries
through examination of (1) the policies underlying both the privilege and the
exception,'25 (2) the existing body of precedent conceming the crime-fraud
exception, and (3) the fundamental fairness implicit in civil litigation.
Considering the explicit language in Rule 104(a) and the implications of Zolin,
some aspect ofthe crime-fraud procedural determination seemingly falls within the

119. 975 F.2d 81, 97 (3d Cir. 1992).

120. 862 F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 1988).
121. See id.; Haines, 975 F.2d at 97.
122. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 n.7 (noting two law review articles which
criticized certain courts' automatic invocation of the crime-fraud exception upon a prima facie
showing). The cases which applied this automatic invocation of the exception were in the criminal
grand jury context and did not deal with the use of the communications at trial against the claiming
party. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.
1984)
123. See Laser Indus., Ltd. v. Reliant Techs., Inc., 167 F.R.D. 417, 430 (N.D. Cal. 1996). For a
discussion of Bourjaily, see supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
124. American Tobacco, 697 So. 2d at 1253-56.
125. See supra Part III.
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purview of Rule 104(a). Significantly, Rule 104(a) governs "the existence of a
privilege" and not the existence of an exception. 6 If Rule 104(a) does indeed
govern the crime-fraud procedure-clearly not the rule in the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions-then the tobacco industry and Laser Industries
mischaracterizes Rule 104(a) as requiring that the party opposing the privilege
prove by a preponderance of evidence that the exception applies. If courts find that
Rule 104(a) does govern the crime-fraud procedure and a privilege challenger
makes a prima facie showing that the exception applies, then theprivilege claimant
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the exception is inapplicable.
When a party claims the privilege, that party carries the burden of only a prima
facie showing that the communication satisfies the technical requirements of the
privilege." The privilege challenger then must present evidence to overcome the
initial evidence presented by the claiming party. If this rebuttal evidence is
insufficient to defeat the claiming party's initial evidence, the court should grant the
claiming party a preliminary recognition of privilege-properly characterized as a
facial grant of privilege.
At this point, the privilege claimant is allowed a presumption against exceptions
to the privilege. In other words, the privilege claimant is not required to disprove
all possible exceptions to the privilege. This presumption temporarily shifts the
burden to the privilege challenger to invoke an exception to the privilege. For the
court to require further proof from the privilege claimant against a particular
exception, the privilege challenger must present evidence which sufficiently invokes
an exception to the privilege.'
Adjudication of the crime-fraud exception is separate from the facial
determination of privilege. The gravamen of the crime-fraud exception is the
client's abuse of confidential communication for misconduct. 2 9 Even if a claimant
meets the technical requirements of privilege, the crime-fraud exception prevents
the recognition of such privilege. Therefore, to successfully invoke the exception,
the privilege challenger need not overcome evidence previously presented by the
privilege claimant. The privilege challenger need only overcome the presumption
against the exception, thereby shifting the burden back to the privilege claimant to
disprove the exception. 3 Courts have held that a prima facie showing is sufficient
to require such further proof by the privilege claimant.'

126. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
127. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393-94, 401 (1981).
128. The reason for this presumption is obvious. Requiring both courts and privilege claimants
to present speculative proof against all possible exceptions to the privilege would be tremendously
burdensome.
129. Establishing a specific subjective intent on the client's part to commit misconduct is not
required; rather, a court should apply an objective test. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
130. See In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 625-26 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The question here is not whether
the evidence supports a verdict but whether it calls for inquiry.").
131. See supranote 98 (defining "prima facie case").
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The policies of our legal system support the prima facie standard. First, the
privilege claimant is attempting to depart from the normal procedures of discovery
by obtaining protection for certain communications. The law disfavors such2
departure, because it presents "'an obstacle to the investigation of the truth."'1
Thus, claims of privilege should be "'strictly confined within the narrowest possible
limits.""' 3 Second, the burden of establishing the privilege lies with the privilege
claimant.'
Invoking the crime-fraud exception annuls the privilege." 5 If the
exception applies, the privilege cannot exist.' 36 Therefore, if the challenger shows
prima facie evidence of the crime-fraud exception, then the privilege claimant has
not established the privilege. Third, the privilege challenger has not been exposed
to the questionable communications. Placing the burden of proof on the party
which has limited, if any, access to the communications does not promote the
interests of justice and fair play. Requiring the party with superior access to and
familiarity with the communications to justify the application of the privilege is
137
more rational.
In summary, the crime-fraud procedure is a part of the privilege determination.
Ifthe privilege challenger presents sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption
against exceptions, the privilege claimant must explain why the exception does not
apply. The tobacco industry's argument for placing a preponderance burden on the
privilege challenger is an attempt to bifurcate the privilege determination procedure
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Other than the isolated court in Laser
Industries, no support for such a separation exists. 3 If Rule 104(a) governs the
determination of privilege, then it also governs the invocation of the crime-fraud
exception.
Under this explanation, if Rule 104(a) does in fact govern the crime-fraud
procedure, the ultimate burden cannot lie with the privilege challenger. If a court
must conduct the weighing process as recognized by.American Tobacco court, the
privilege claimant bears the preponderance burden. While in tune with the spirit
and language of Bourjaily,"9 this burden allocation is also proper in the context of
the crime-fraud procedure.

132. NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900,907 (4th Cir. 1965) (quoting WIGMOREONEVIDENCE, supra
note 41, § 2292).
133. Id.
134. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1981).
135. See supra Part III (discussing the policy behind both the exception and the privilege).
136. The Supreme Court recognized this fact in UnitedStates v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989). The
Court stated: "We see no basis for holding that the tapes [claimed to be privileged] in this case must
be deemed privileged under Rule 104(a) while the question of crime or fraud remains open." Id. at 568.
137. See In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 626 (7th. Cir. 1988).

138. For a discussion of Laser Industries, Ltd. v. Reliant Technologies, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 417
(N.D. Cal. 1996), see supranotes 114-23 and accompanying text.
139. See supraPart IV.A (discussing the threshold requirement set forth by UnitedStatesv. Zolin,
491 U.S. 554 (1989)).
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The best explanation for Rule 104(a)'s applicability is very simple. Rule 104(a)
simply places the determination of privilege in the hands of the court rather than a
jury. The exact procedure for this determination is governed not by Bour/aily, but
by common law principles established in courts over the years. The only true
burden that the privilege challenger faces is the initial Zolin threshold showing.'4
Once the challenger meets this threshold and the court reviews the disputed
communications in camera, the privilege claimant must substantiate its claim of
privilege. If the privilege claimant is unable to dispel any and all reasonable
questions concerning the legitimacy of its claim, the claim should fail.
C. The Inevitable Appeals
If the court finds sufficient evidence to invoke the crime-fraud exception, and
the privilege claimant's rebuttal evidence is insufficient, then the court orders the
privilege claimant to turn over the contested communications to the privilege
challenger through either document production or deposition.' 4 ' At this point, the
privilege claimant can be expected to appeal the court's decision. A denial of
privilege cannot be appealed as of right; however, the privilege claimant may be
granted a permissible appeal under federal law or a related state statutory
provision. 42 For example, in federal court, the trial court must certify the issue for
interlocutory appeal, and the appellate court may allow the appeal.' 43 To receive an
interlocutory appeal, a district court judge must state in writing that three elements
are satisfied: (1) the matter to be appealed involves a "controlling question of law;"
(2) a "substantial ground for difference of opinion" concerning the matter exists;
44
and (3) an appeal may "materially advance" the litigation towards a conclusion.'
In addition, if the party requesting the interlocutory appeal will suffer irreparable
harn that cannot be rectified through final appeal, then the court of appeals may
grant the order.145 State provisions generally include the same or similar
46
requirements.
The reasons that courts frequently grant certification relate directly to the three
factors discussed above. Because the tobacco industry claims privilege to nearly all
its documents related to the litigated issues, the discovery of the documents is a
controlling issue. Without those documents, the Attorneys General will have a
more difficult time presenting viable claims against the tobacco industry.
Conversely, ifthe courts ultimately order the industry to produce the documents, the

140. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the threshold requirement set forth by Zolin).
141. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572.
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (as amended 1996).
143. See id. § 1292(b).
144. Id.
145. Id.; see In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 112-13 (1st Cir. 1981).
146. See, e.g., Blank v. Mukamal, 556 So. 2d 54, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam)
(granting certiorari to produce privileged information protected by attorney-client privilege).
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tobacco industry is more likely to offer a settlement, thereby substantially advancing
the litigation. 47
' Considering the apparent controversy that the tobacco industry has.
created over the exact procedure and burden of proof in determining application of
the exception, the tobacco industry has argued successfully that the issue should be
certified to the appellate courts. Predictably, the tobacco industry also has argued
that it will suffer irreparable harm if they are not granted an immediate appeal.
Though this argument generally has merit,'48 privilege does not exist for a large
number of the tobacco documents. For instance, the Merrell Williams documents
and certain Liggett documents are within the public domain. The seal of secrecy,
the central focus of the irreparable harm factor, has been broken because the
opposing party has access to the documents in question, thereby destroying the need
for an immediate appeal.'49
Though the tobacco industry has created an apparent controversy over the
technical labels attached to many aspects of the crime-fraud procedure, most courts
follow substantially similar procedures. Once a court recognizes the lack of any
real controversy, an essential element of certification is eliminated. Provided the
correct process is followed, courts should not have a reason to grant certification of
this issue. 5 °
V. RED HERRINGS IN CRImE-FRAUD
In the current tobacco litigation, the tobacco industry has confused the issues
in crime-fraud procedure. Although loosely based on the language of certain courts,
these arguments have little merit. Properly armed with a firm understanding of the
policies underlying the exception and the procedure applied by the courts, privilege
challengers can easily dispel these arguments.
A.

Where's the Fraud?

The most frequently used argument against invoking the exception is that the
challenger did not show a specific and identifiable crime or fraud. In other words,
the privilege claimant will argue that the challenger must allege misconduct
constituting either a crime or actionable fraud as defined under the law of the

147. After the ruling inAmerican Tobacco Co. v. Florida,697 So. 2d 1249 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App.
1997), the tobacco industry expeditiously settled the Attorney General's lawsuit.
148. See, e.g., Riano v. Heritage Corp. of S. Fla., 665 So. 2d 1142, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) ("A non-final order that is not appealable... is reviewable by petition for certiorari only where
it... cause[es] material injury... that would be irreparable by way of appeal at the conclusion ofthe
case.")).

149. See id. at 1144.
150. See BarclaysAmerican Corp. v. Kane, 746 F.2d 653, 655 (10th Cir. 1984) (denying
petitioner's writ of mandamus seeking to vacate the district court's order which denied the petitioner
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection).
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jurisdiction.' However, only a few courts utilize a narrow scope of the exception
52
that requires such a rigorous standard for invoking the crime-fraud procedure.'
Policy concerns,' as well as factors that call for abstention from requiring
proof of technical elements,1 4 support broad construction of the crime-fraud
exception. Courts have defined the conduct which invokes the crime-fraud
exception quite broadly.'
Requiring proof of each element of a specific and
recognized crime or fraud would cut against the substantial weight of authority.
Under the tobacco industry's argument concerning the opposing party's burden
of proof, a trial would not be necessary to adjudicate the misconduct after such a
crime-fraud determination is made. According to the industry, the opposing party
can invoke the crime-fraud exception only by proving all the elements of an
actionable crime or fraud by a preponderance of the evidence. If the privilege
claimant carries this burden, a jury trial would only determine whether the jury
agrees with the judge. In this light, one can readily see that this characterization of
the crime-fraud procedure is fundamentally flawed in its reasoning. In particular,
an almost identical situation involving the concealment of health hazards arose in
the Dalkon Shield litigation.5 6 A.H. Robins, the manufacturer of the Dalkon
Shield,
failed to adequately test the Dalkon Shield before marketing it; attempted
to develop... evidence which misrepresented the nature, quality, safety
and efficacy ofthe Dalkon Shield; ignored the mounting evidence against
the Dalkon Shield; ... relied upon invalid studies in an effort to refute...
dangers . . . caused by the Dalkon Shield; and attempted, with the
assistance of counsel, to devise strategies to cover up [its] responsibilities
and lessen its liability with respect to the Dalkon Shield.'57
This behavior is nearly identical to that of the tobacco industry. The courts in the
Dalkon Shield litigation applied the crime-fraud exception to all documents

151. See Brief of Petitioner at 21-22, American Tobacco Co. v. Florida, 697 So. 2d 1249 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (No. 97-1405).
152. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
153. See supraPart III.
154. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 402 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (refusing to require
proof of each element for fear that the process would result in a "mini-trial"); In re Sealed Case, 676
F.2d 793, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (discussing the impossibility of a true adversarial proceeding where
only one party is privy to contested communications).
155. See, e.g., SealedCase, 754 F.2d at 399 ("crime, fraud or other misconduct"); Sealed Case,
676 F.2d at 807 ("manipulation of the truth-seeking process"); Central Constr. Co. v. Home Indemn.
Co., 794 P.2d 595, 598 (Alaska 1990) ("badfaith breach of a duty" or "deception and deceit in any
form").
156. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 107 F.R.D. 2 (D. Kan. 1985).
157. Id. at 14-15.
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pertaining to A.H. Robins's concealment. 5 Thus, the exception clearly applies to
any industry's pattern of concealment.
B. The "In Furtherance"Standard
Courts often use the phrase "in furtherance" to describe the level of relatedness
between a communication and misconduct to invoke the crime-fraud exception.' 59
Some courts have held that the communication must be in furtherance of the
misconduct. 60 This phrase has caused much confusion among the courts and has
been used consistently by the tobacco industry. The tobacco industry claims that
the in-furtherance standard requires a finding that the communication procured or
directly advanced the misconduct.'' A close examination of the standard as courts
interpret it reveals a much less stringent burden.
Clearly, the relationship between the communication and the misconduct must
be more than a'mere coincidence in time,".. and the communication must, at the
very least, be "relevant evidence" of the misconduct.'63 In addition, the
communication must be "sufficiently related" to the misconduct to invoke the
crime-fraud exception."6 This relationship requirement "should not be interpreted
restrictively"; 65 rather, it must take into account that the opposing party does not
have access to the communications, thus precluding a truly adversarial
66
presentation.
In re GrandJury Proceedings67 presents an excellent discussion of what the
in-furtherance standard requires. In that case, the court stated the well-recognized
premise that the central focus ofthe relatedness determination is the client's intent
in obtaining legal advice. 6 The in-furtherance standard is sufficiently satisfied if
the advice advanced or was intended to advance the misconduct. 69 Actual
furtherance of the misconduct is not necessary; only the intent to further misconduct

158. See id.at 8-16.

159. See, e.g., In re Richard Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (requiring the
communications to be "in furtherance" ofcommitting a crime or fraud); In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805
F.2d 155, 164 (6th Cir. 1986) (requiring the privilege challenger to "establish some relationship
between the communication... and theprimafacie violation").
160. See, e.g., RichardRoe, 68 F.3d at 40.
161. See Brief of Petitioner at 25, American Tobacco Co. v. Florida, No. 95-1466 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
162. See In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
163. See RichardRoe, 68 F.3d at 40.
164. See Inre Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223,1227 (1Ith Cir. 1987); In re International
Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1243 (5th Cir. 1982) ("reasonably relate"); In re
A.H. Robins Co., 107 F.R.D. 2, 15 (D. Kan. 1985) ("close relationship").
165. GrandJury Investigation,842 F.2d at 1227.
166. See In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 1988).
167. 87 F.3d 377 (9th Cir. 1996).
168. Id. at 381.
169. See id.
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is required to meet the standard.'7 ° If the communication is ineffective to further
misconduct, or even if it hinders completing the misconduct, a court will still find
that the communication is not privileged.'7 '
The following hypothetical illustrates how the furtherance standard is applied:
A man informs his attorney that he wants to kill his wife, but does not wish
to face the death penalty if convicted. He then asks his attorney which
state may provide a great "vacation" spot, allowing him to murder his wife
while avoiding the ultimate punishment. The attorney provides the
requested information, and the client leaves the office.
This hypothetical illustrates that the conversation should not be privileged
regardless of whether the client travels to a state without the death penalty to kill his
wife, if he kills his wife in their home, or if he does nothing at all. Under the
tobacco industry's argument, the client would have had to travel to the appropriate
state and killed his wife to invoke the crime-fraud exception. Simply stated, no
rational basis for such a requirement exists.
C. The Post-Hoc Spin
After a challenger presents sufficient prima facie evidence to call for further
inquiry into the existence of a privilege, the Haines-Feldberg rule allows the
claiming party to explain or rebut the evidence.'72 In the current tobacco litigation,
the tobacco industry has tried to distort the true nature of the documents. The
industry has presented rather innovative explanations of what the documents
actually relate. Plaintiffs call this explanation the "post-hoc spin."
When a privilege claimant presents such distortions at the rebuttal stage,
particularly through ex parte submission, the court must be cautioned. A court
should, and normally does, allow the privilege challenger to controvert the
claimant's rebuttal in order to place the disputed communications within the correct
context. This explanation of the crime-fraud procedure contemplates allowing the
privilege challenger an opportunity to present a rebuttal argument without resistance
from the courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The procedure for invoking the crime-fraud exception to a claim of privilege
is a complex and intricate process which enjoys little uniformity in the courts.
However, a close examination of the leading cases and policies underlying the

170. See id. at 382.

171. Id.
172. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
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exception reveals a rational and worthy procedure which all courts can follow.
Courts need some type of unanimity to avoid conflicting rulings in the area of multistate mass torts. This article has presented an explanation of the procedure which
comports with the current practice and philosophy of the majority of courts
nationwide.
Courts should broadly construe and apply the exception to prevent the type of
insidious behavior which results from blind adherence to an absolute attorney-client
privilege. No better example illustrates this abuse of our legal protections than the
tobacco industry. Once the crime-fraud exception is used for its intended
purpose-to deter any misconduct and prevent protection for such misconduct
under the guise of privilege-the legal profession and thejudicial process will more
closely achieve its quest for truth and justice.
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